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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAWN W. HORNE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 20187 
W. REID HORNE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FQR REVIEW 
May the trial court, upon finding of good cause, enter 
Nunc Pro Tunc to the date of settlement agreement an order of 
distribution of property and other related matters as originally 
presented and read into the record on the 20th day of June, 
1984? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. S 30-4a-l (Supp. 1983): 
Authority of Court. A court having jurisdiction may, upon 
its finding of good cause and giving of such notice as may be 
ordered, enter an order Nunc Pro Tunc is 
marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage. 
a matter relating to 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
This is the reply to an appeal of the trial court's entry 
Nunc Pro Tunc in a matter relating to a divorce. There is really 
only one issue at dispute here. It is an argument over the 
tax consequences of a divorce. 
Course of Proceedings 
On June 20, 1984, the parties entered into a property settlement 
and that settlement was read into the record in Judge's chambers 
with counsel and parties present. Judge Rigtrup asked each 
party if they understood the settlement and agreed to be bound 
by it. Each party answered yes. 
For all practical purposes, the agreement was in effect 
and each party set about doing those things as required by the 
settlement. The transfer of the Townhouse Court Apartments 
took place and was effective on July 1, 1984. 
The dispute arose when defendant wanted language added 
to the agreement that the agreement constituted an attempt to 
equalize the marital assets of the parties. This was inconsistent 
with the facts. 
The total fair market value of the property received by 
each spouse was not equal. Mr. Home received much more than 
Mrs. Home did. In a noncommunity property state, such as Utah, 
the property must be jointly owned. The property was separately 
owned. The Townhouse Court Apartments were owned by Mr. Home 
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prior to the couples marriage. (Under the tax law prior to 
July 18/ 1984/ an equal division of property that was co-owned 
did not result in gain or loss). 
Failing to have the untrue tax language added to the documents/ 
Mr. Home and his counsel refused to cooperate in any way and 
delayed the matter for several weeks. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
On August 17/ 1984/ the court entered its Order of Property 
Division Nunc Pro Tunc to June 20, 1984 that being the day the 
settlement was made and could have been signed/ dated/ filed 
and entered. 
Facts 
Plaintiff/ Dawn W. Home, and defendant W. Reid Home were 
married on January 17r 1970. Plaintiff filed for divorce on 
February 19/ 1980. On January 27/ 1984/ the parties were divorced. 
Plaintiff and defendant brought substantial premarital 
property into the marriage, and the parties accumulated substantial 
property during the marriage. After plaintiff filed for divorce, 
defendant disposed of a very large portion of the parties property. 
In November of 1981/ defendant sold his nephew and partner his 
half interest in Larry H. Miller Toyota of Salt Lake and eleven 
other entities for a fraction of their value. He also disposed 
of various large equipment and real property. Plaintiff received 
nothing from the sales. 
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Trial of the division of property portion of the case began 
on June 19, 1984, and was scheduled to run four days. On the 
second day of the trial, parties entered into negotiations and 
reached a settlement agreement. Plaintiff wished to continue 
with the trial but was urged by her attorneys to accept settlement. 
She was advised that by taking the older premarital property, 
she would have the tax advantage of the stepped up basis and 
that by settling by stipulation, the matter would be settled 
once and for all, without possibility of appeal. 
Under the law at the time, the defendant had a tax liability 
for capital gains on the property up to the date of transfer 
and the plaintiff had no gain or loss on the transaction. The 
basis of the property to the plaintiff would be its fair market 
value on the date of transfer. It is very important to the 
plaintiff to have the stepped up basis. 
Under the law at the time, an equal division of property 
that was co-owned was not a taxable event. This settlement 
was not an equal division and the property was not jointly owned 
and thus, the exception to the Davis rule was not applicable. 
The Court approved the settlement and requested plaintiff's 
counsel to prepare an appropriate order. Plaintiff's counsel 
submitted to defendant's counsel, proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order of Distribution of Real and 
Personal Property, Payment of Debts, Support, Attorney's Fees 
and Other Related Matters on the 29th day of June, 1984, pursuant 
to the stipulation of the parties read into the record on the 
20th day of June, 1984. 
-4-
Counsel for the defendant returned said documents approximately 
two (2) weeks later requesting certain changes that did not 
conform with the agreement reached by the palrties. 
Minor changes were made to the plaintiff's proposed Findings, 
Conclusions and Order and sent on to the Court for signature. 
Thereafter , an informal conference was held with the Court in 
chambers, and the Court concluded a transcri|pt of the proceedings 
was necessary and that the matter should} be continued until 
said transcript was obtained. 
Plaintiff's review of the transcript of the decision as 
stipulated to by the parties in open Court and read into the 
record, is in conformity with the Findings ofi Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Order of Distribution of Real and Personal Property, 
Payment of Debts, Support, Attorney's Fees and Other Related 
Matters first submitted to the Court by plaintiff's counsel. 
(A copy of said transcript is attached hereto and made a part 
hereof by reference). 
Defendant's contention that the stipulation was to include 
certain tax assumptions and consequences is not supported by 
said transcript and said objections should be denied. 
At the time of reading of the Stipulation into the record, 
United States v. Davis was the law of the l^ nd and in full force 
and effect. Plaintiff's negotiations relied upon the law set 
forth in that case and the agreement reache4 at that time should 
be adopted herein and the Plaintiff should have the benefit 
of the stepped up basis on said properties foif which she bargained. 
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On or about July 18, 1984, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 was 
signed into law by President Reagan. Said Act abolished the 
holding of United States v. Davis, and any Decree signed on 
or after the 18th of July, 1984 would literally wipe out what 
the plaintiff had bargained for and received by her agreement 
necessitating the entry of the Findings, Conclusions and Order 
Nunc Pro Tunc as of the 20th day of June, 1984, the date judgment 
was rendered in said matter. 
Summary of Argument 
This is a matter relating to divorce and the Court clearly 
has the authority to enter an Order Nunc Pro Tunc. 
Good cause existed to enter the Nunc Pro Tunc Order. At 
the time of reading of the Stipulation into the record, United 
States v. Davis was the law of the land and in full force and 
effect. Respondent's negotiations relied upon the law set forth 
in that case and respondent should have the benefit of the stepped 
up basis on said properties for which she bargained and to which 
appellant agreed to. 
Appellant deliberately delayed signing of the agreement 
in order to benefit from the change in the tax law. The Nunc 
Pro Tunc Order by Judge Rigtrup is to correct that injustice. 
-6-
ARGUMENT 
Appellant's Arguments are Inconsistent With the Facts 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT: THE LOWER COURTfS ENTRY 
OF THE NUNC PRO TUNC WAS IMPROPER IN THAT THE 
ORDER INCORPORATED SUBSTANTIVE RULINGS MADE 
AFTER THE PARTIES1 AGREEMENT. 
Fact: The changes Judge Rigtrup made were to correct the 
record to "speak the truth", and correctly represent the agreement 
read to the Court on June 20, 1984, and to which all parties 
agreed to. This Nunc Pro Tunc Order was a reflection of a previously 
made ruling in which no reference was made to the tax consequences. 
If you will refer to reporter's transcript of June 20, 
1984, in the addendum you will see that the Order of August 
17th correctly reflects the events of June 20, 1984. 
The Preece case in which Mrs. Preece sought to become a 
widow instead of a divorcee and won, doles not apply to this 
case. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT; THE LOWER COURT'S ENTRY 
OF ITS ORDER WENT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF ITS 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY. 
Fact: A Court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding 
of good cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter 
an order Nunc Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, 
legal separation or annulment of marriage. Utah Code Ann, S 
30-4a-l (Utah 1983). 
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This is a matter relating to divorce. There was good cause 
to enter the Order Nunc Pro Tunc. For all practical purposes, 
the Order was in effect on June 20, 1984, and each party set 
about doing those things as required by the settlement. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT: EVEN IF ENTRY OF THE 
ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC WAS OTHERWISE PROPER, THE 
COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED THE NUNC PRO TUNC 
MOTION IN EXCHANGE FOR PLAINTIFFS ABANDONMENT 
OF THE CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT. 
Fact; Plaintiff never "filed charges" of misconduct, not 
with the Court and not with the bar. 
The hearing of August 8, 1984 was for one purpose only, 
it was on a motion by plaintiff to change counsel. Plaintiff 
had never filed charges against her counsel and was only explaining 
why she wished to change counsel if in fact the case was not 
over and needed to go back to trial. 
Mr. Gustin, of Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, argued 
that the case was over on June 20, 1984, and that the only purpose 
of changing counsel was to cheat their firm out of attorney 
fees. 
The Court ruled that the case was over on June 20, 1984 
and that there was no tax language in that agreement and Mrs. Home 
should have the benefit of the stepped up basis for which she 
had bargained and which was clearly the law of the land at that 
time. 
Plaintiff was willing to drop her request for a change 
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of counsel if the case was indeed over with on June 20, 1984. 
A reading of the transcript of August 8, 1984 will prove 
appellants argument is totally inconsistant yith the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
I ask you to let Judge Rigtrup's Nunc Pto Tunc ruling stand. 
Under the circumstances it is a fair and proper ruling. 
To overturn the Nunc Pro Tunc is to allow appellant to 
make a settlement under the old tax law and then failing to 
later have some untrue tax language put into the settlement, 
allow him to use delay tactics to delay final signing several 
weeks so that he could take advantage of the new tax law and 
deprive Mrs. Home of the tax advantage she had bargained for 
under the original agreement. 
In addition, the issue may be moot. The 1984 Tax Reform 
Act applies to transfers after July 18, 1984. The transfer 
of the Townhouse Court Apartments took plape and was effective 
on July 1, 1984. Whether you rule for or Against the Nunc Pro 
Tunc, the final decision on this tax matter will rest with the 
Internal Revenue Service. 
lift RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *1 day of January, 1985. 
DAWN W. HORNE 
g y UouAsn^ tl}\< ^ft/Tsnji^ 
Dawn W. Horhe 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Internal Revenue Service publication 504 (Rev. Nov. 1983). 
2. 1984 Tax Reform Act. 
3. Reporter's Partial Transcript of June 29, 1984. 
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has a taxable gain of $40,000 ($80,000 fair mar-
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or loss. Her basis in the property is $80,000. 
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of survivorship, tenants by the entirety, or ten-
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vada, New Mexico, Texas, or Washington) an 
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ncncomrnunity property state. As a part of ttjeir 
divorce, they agree to equally divide their jointly 
owned property. Harry and Edith own no sepa-
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They intend to divide their property equally, 
but certain assets cannot be divided because 
they are associated with a particular liability; or 
they are part of a business venture that can i be 
managed by only one person. Therefore, some 
assets are given to Harry and other assets Of 
nearly equal value are given to Edith. The rest 
of the assets are equally divided. 
The total net fair market value of the jointly 
owned property is $300,000, Harry receives as-
sets valued at $150,258, while Edith receive^ 
assets worth $149,742. The difference in th£ 
value of the property that each receives ($^16) 
is due to the property that could not be equally 
divided, t o make up the difference, Harry ^ives 
Edith a note for $258. , 
u J Although Edith could consider Harry's note 
as a sale or exchange of property rights in 
some of the assets for consideration not pert of 
the assets (the note), it is not important enough 
to prevent the division from being about equal. 
The transaction, therefore, is not considered a 
taxable exchange. 
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received is the part related to the community o 
jointly owned basis. 
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loss. The gain or loss is the difference betweei 
the net fair market value and the adjusted basi 
The formula you must use to figure the taxabU 
gain is shown in the following example. 
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has no separately owned property. 
The divorce decree gives Mary jointly owne 
property that has a net fair market value of 
$55,000. Tom is awarded the rest of the joint!} 
held property, which has a net fair market vali 
of $15,000. He gets all of his separately owne 
property, which has a net fair market value of 
$40,000. 
The adjusted basis of the jointly owned pro 
erty received by Mary is $29,500. This include 
personal furniture which has an adjusted bas 
of $6,000 and a net fair market value of $4,00 
Therefore, Mary has a loss of $2,000 on the fi 
> niture. Because a loss on property held for pi 
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duces the adjusted basis of all the property s 
received to $27,500. 
The division of the jointly owned property i 
not equal. Tom gives up a part of his share c 
the jointly owned property for Mary's marital 
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Gain 
1984 Tax Reform Act 
Domestic Relations Provisions 
Transfers of Property 
Gain has generally been recognized on 
certain transfers of property in exchange 
for marital rights of a spouse or former 
spouse. Beginning after July 13. 1S34, trans-
fers of property between spouses or fonder 
spouses, if incident to a divorce, will no ion^er 
result in the recognition of gain or loss. The 
basjs of« the property transferred will be 
the transferor's adjusted basis. 
Incident to divorce—A transfer is incident 
to a divorce if it occurs within one year 
after the marriage ceases or is related to 
the cessation. 
Election—Although this provision gener-
ally only applies to transfers aft . July 
18, 1984, if both spouses or former spouses 
elect, this non-recognition of gain can be 
applied to transfers made after December 
31, )QS3. Further, the provisions do not 
appiy to transfers made after July 18, 1984 
pursuant to an instrument in effect on or 
before that date unless both spouses or 
former spouses elect to have the nton-
rccogmtion provision apply. 
Alimony 
Alimony is generally deductible by the 
payor and includible in the income of the 
payee. Beginning in 1985, only cash pay-
ments pursuant to a divorce or separation 
agreement that will terminate upon the death 
of the payee made between former spouses 
not living in the same household will qualify 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
DAWN W. HORNE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. REID HORNE, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. D80-668 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 
June 20, 1984 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, 
District Court Judge 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Paul H. Liapis 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & 
LIAPIS 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard K. Crandall 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
11th Floor, 10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
GAYLE 5. CAMPBELL 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1984; 10:00 A. M. 
-ooOoo-
[The Court, having conferred with counsel 
and parties off the record, and negotiations having taken 
place, the following proceedings were held in chambers 
with counsel and parties present at 3:12 p.m.] 
THE COURT: The attorneys have advised the 
Court that they have settled the outstanding issue in 
this case; is that correct? 
MR. LIAPIS: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is that right, Mr. Crandall? 
MR- CRANDALL: Yes, I hope so. I think 
we've got it all agreed to. 
THE COURT: Will you state what the agreement] 
is on the record, Mr. Liapis? 
MR. LIAPIS: Yes, I would. Let me just 
locate the checklist here. 
THE COURT: Plaintiff may have a divorce, 
final on entry. 
MR. LIAPIS: That has already been entered, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: That's right. I can't do that. 
She got one in advance. 
MR. LIAPIS: With regard to the properties, 
2 ! 
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the plaintiff, Mrs. Home , will be awarded the 
condominium which she's now residing in, the duplexes — 
THE COURT: 
MR. LIAPIS: 
ask that. 
MRS. HORNE: 
THE COURT: 
MR. LIAPIS: 
Where at? 
Well, I knew you were going to 
691 East 4181 South. 
Okay. 
The two duplexes at 1925-27 East 
1700 South and 1933-37 East 1700 South. That's free and 
clear of any interest of 1 the defendant, and subject to 
plaintiff assuming and paying the mortgage payments thereon 
THE COURT: Plaintiff to assume and pay 
mortgage payments? Is that what yoiu said? 
MR. LIAPIS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. LIAPIS: 
Yes. 
All right. 
In addition, the plaintiff will 
be awarded all right, title and interest in and to the j 
Townhouse Court apartment 
appliances. Is there any 
MR. HORNE: 
MR. LIAPIS: 
the whole thing. It will 
exchange item to equalize 
in this matter. 
MR. HORNE: 
complex, together with all of the 
furniture in it? 
No. 
Appliances, deposits, rentals, 
be transferred to her as an 
the marital assets of the parties, 
Could I mike one point? Could 
3 
we have a cutoff point as of the first of the month? 
MR. LIAPIS: What is today? 
MR, HORNE: It's the 20th. 
MR. LIAPIS: That's fine. Commencing with 
the first of July. Is that all right? 
MRS. HORNE: That's fine. 
MR. LIAPIS: Plaintiff will assume the first 
mortgage payment thereon, taxes conimencing with the month 
of July through the end of the year. 
MR. HORNE: The reserve account is set up 
at Prudential. 
MR. LIAPIS: The reserve account likewise 
will be transferred. 
MR. HORNE: That will go with it. 
MR. LIAPIS: All right. And there is no 
shortage in that reserve account? 
MR. HORNE: No, there's $833 at the first 
of the year that was left over, so — 
MR. LIAPIS: And there have been payments 
made? 
MR. HORNE: It's been made every month. 
There should be an overage, not an underage. 
MR. LIAPIS: In addition, the plaintiff will 
be awarded the vacant lot at 6716 13th East as her sole 
and separate property, free and clear of any interest of 
4 
1 j the defendant. 
2 Defendant will be awarded, by way of 
3 properties — let me start at the front. 
4 THE COURT: Awarded all other real property? 
5 MR. LIAPIS: All the rest, which would 
6 include, for the Court's notes, the Suzie-Q Apartments, 
7 the Elm Avenue five-plex, the Townhouse Villa complex, 
8 the Townhouse II complex, the office and warehouse complex, 
9 the Edison property, Snowbird Iron Blosam time share, and 
10 lot 76 of Bloomington Country Club. 
11 Plaintiff will be awarded all right, title 
12 and interest in and to the balloon payment that's part of 
13 the sale of the 4400 South State Street property, including 
14 the monthly payments. 
15 THE COURT: Of how much? 
16 MR. LIAPIS: $160,000 is the principal sum. 
17 THE COURT: Due when? 
?8 MR. LIAPIS: With eleven and a half per cent 
19 interest, I think it was. Due Novei^ober of 1988. 
20 THE COURT: And what's the property? 
21 MR. LIAPIS: 4400 Sou^h State Street. And 
22 that would include the payment of the regular monthly 
23 payments on that balloon of $2,000 4 month. 
24 THE COURT: She's just awarded the seller's 
25 interest? 
MR. HORNE: That's right, 
2
 I MR. LIAPIS: That's correct. And he is 
3
 I awarded, in addition, the Honeywood Condominiums at — the 
two Honeywood Condominiums. 
5
 I The defendant will pay to plaintiff the 
6
 sum of $5,000 today, $15,000 cash in ten days, and an 
7
 additional $5,000. 
8 THE COURT: $5,000 today and $15,000 when? 
9
 MR. LIAPIS: Ten days from today. $5,000 
10 cash in six months. Okay. 
11 The June support payment will be considered 
12 paid with the transfer of the $5,000 today. The defendant 
13 will maintain the plaintiff as an owner with the defendant 
14
 paying the premium on a $100,000 term life insurance 
15 policy, a reasonable rate policy. 
16 THE COURT: Defendant will maintain a 
17
 J $100,000 life insurance policy? 
MR. LIAPIS: With plaintiff to have 
ownership, plaintiff beneficiary. Defendant pays the 
premium. 
21 I THE COURT: Term policy. All right. 
22
 J MR. LIAPIS: And he'll give us notification 
of the policy. You'll have to give us the policy. 
18 
19 
20 
23 
24 Defendant will continue to obtain for the 
25 plaintiff a new Toyota automobile at wholesale cost, and 
that's wholesale to the dealer, not to the retailer to the 
public, as long as that privilege is provided to him. 
That means that she'll pay for the* wholesale price, but 
we get the benefit of his benefits. 
The parties agree that if the defendant in 
any way, shape or form ever returns to an interest in the 
Toyota dealership that's involved in this lawsuit, that 
she'll automatically be awarded one-half interest. 
No alimony to either party. The defendant 
will, within 60 days or sooner placpe a new roof on the 
duplex at 1935-37 East 1700 South, at his cost and expense 
through his workers. 
THE COURT: At his cost and expense? 
So plaintiff will pay? 
MR. HORNE: No, defendant will pay. 
MR. LIAPIS: Defendant will pay at no cost 
to the plaintiff. Total cost to the defendant. 
If there are any additional claims for 
attorneys1 fees from this action by plaintiff against 
defendant, she will assume and pay the balance. 
THE COURT: What do you mean? Each party 
pay their own fees and costs? 
MR. LIAPIS: After the transfer of those 
cash sums we referred to earlier. 
THE COURT: So each ofj you pay their own 
1
 I fees and costs? 
2
 MR. LIAPIS: Right 
3
 THE COURT: Then you can decide between you 
4 
and the clients who gets it. 
5
 J MR. LIAPIS: The parties will each assume 
and pay the debts and obligations against their respective 
properties that they are receiving, as well as any debts 
8
 | which they have incurred in their own name since the 
filing. 
10
 Defendant will further hold us harmless from 
11
 ' any tax obligations that result from prior joint filing 
12
 I of tax returns, which I think ended with what, 1981? 
13
 MRS. HORNE: 198 2 but you haven't actually 
14
 ' filed but you are going to file that as a joint return? 
15
 I MR. HORNE: For 1982 I guess we still can 
16
 I THE COURT: There's no filing at this point 
Each party will execute necessary documents? 
MR. LIAPIS: Yes 
MR. HORNE: Do we need to spell out that 
exchange, the way we're going to set that up? 
MR. CRANDALL: I don't think so 
22
 | MR. LIAPIS: We're not through 
23
 J THE COURT: The parties are mutually 
24
 ' restrained from picking on each other 
MR. LIAPIS: Yes. The defendant will further 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
25 
1 be awarded all his right, title and interest in and to 
2 his business entitled W. R. H o m e , incorporated. 
3 THE COURT: Each awarded own checking and 
4
 savings account? 
5 I MR. LIAPIS: Bank accounts. That's right. 
6 Each is awarded own retirement, stoctk plans, et cetera, 
7 if any. Don't you have some retirement benefits at 
8 St. Mark's? 
9 M RS. HORNE: I don't think so. Working 
10 part time, I don't think they provide me with any. 
11 MR. LIAPIS: The plaintiff will be awarded 
12 her 1982 Toyota Cressida automobile. Plaintiff and 
13 defendant are each awarded the furniture in their 
14 possession. 
15 Defendant will be awarded the 30,000 shares 
16 of Challenge Corporation stock, if you still have it. 
77 THE COURT; Defendant awarded? 
18
 MR. LIAPIS: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: Each awarded own personal 
20
 effects, clothing, and all personal property in possession J 
21 MR. LIAPIS: Also, yout Honor, the 
22 defendant has requested a further right of refusal on 
23 any of the properties awarded to the plaintiff if she 
24 J should sell, at whatever bona fide offer that she's 
received on those properties if and when she puts it for 25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
sale or puts them for sale 
A 48-hour time period on that right of 
refusal? 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
LIAPIS: 
COURT: 
LIAPIS: 
How much? 
Forty-eight hours. 
That's not reasonable. 
Sure it is. No one is going 
to give you an earnest money for more than two or three 
daysf 
then 
at best. 
THE 
you ought to 
MR. 
COURT: 
have ten 
LIAPIS: 
an earnest money agreement 
give you an offer 
MR. 
But if you hit it on a Friday, 
days. 
No one is going to stay on 
. for ten days. They're going to 
and expect you to counter it. 
CRANDALI 
probably right. Over the 
seven days. 
THE COURT: 
[Discussion 
MR. 
but we'll exclude 
MR. 
MRS 
MR. 
,: Well, yes. I think that's 
weekend we would probably need 
We'll be off the record. 
off the record.] 
CRANDALL: We want three business days, 
the condo. 
LIAPIS: 
. HORNE: 
LIAPIS: 
three business days? 
Is that all right? 
Yes. 
i 
Is that all right with you, « 
l±_ 
MRS. HORNE: Yes. 
MR. LIAPIS: Your Honor, on the attorneys' 
fees, we may want to spell that out. 
THE COURT: You are required to be 
reasonable. 
MR. CRANDALL: We have it now that each 
party bears their own attorneys1 f^es. A large part of 
this cash settlement is for attorneys1 fees, and I may 
want to examine that from a tax standpoint and change that. 
We may want to make it payable as alimony. 
MR. LIAPIS: No, 
MR, HORNE: The $5,d00 is alimony. 
MR. LIAPIS: No. 
MR. CRANDALL: $25,000 of it is. 
MR. LIAPIS: $20,000 is. The $5,000 is hers. 
MR. CRANDALL: So $2|0,000 of it is attorneys' 
fees and costs? Is that the way it is? 
MR. LIAPIS: I think that's the way it was 
intended. 
THE COURT: And it's not denominated as 
alimony, so ~ 
MR. CRANDALL: No. 
MR. LIAPIS: No. Sc that's it. Do you 
want to ask them if they agree to that? 
THE COURT: Is that as you understand it? 
11 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. CRANDALL: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. HORNE: Youfve heard everything that's 
been read into the record, have you? 
I agree. 
thereby? 
MR. HORNE: Just as long as I get my sword, 
THE COURT: Do you understand it? 
MR. HORNE: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: And you agree to be bound 
MR. HORNE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Home, you have heard whatf d 
been read into the record? 
stipulation 
proceedings 
MRS. HORNE: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you understand it? 
MRS. HORNE: Yes. 
THE COURT: You agree to be bound thereby? 
MRS. HORNE: Yes. 
THE COURT: I will approve the 
of settlement. Will you draft it? 
MR. LIAPIS: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. 
[Whereupon, at the hour of 3:32 p.m., the 
were concluded.] 
-ooOoo- | 
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